ABSTRACT: Democratic leaders stand out, and yet they must persuade an audience that they are one of the crowd. I untangle this apparent paradox by clarifying the duality of a trustworthy and persuasive character. As a speaker in a democracy you must show that you are "one of the boys." You might not be like them in education, speaking style, or economic circumstances; you must not be like them in that you have special knowledge relevant to the matter at hand; but you must be like them in that you share their moral values and political interests. I then give two further applications of the duality of character: I use that duality to explore how the speaker claims our attention in the first place, and to explain the role of principled arguments and the role of factual assertions in political speech.
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Democratic leaders stand out, and yet they must persuade their audience that they are one of the crowd.
I untangle this apparent paradox by clarifying the duality of character. By "the duality of character" I mean the fact that some components of a trustworthy and persuasive character or ēthos must be shared between speaker and audience, and some are unshared, unique to the speaker. As a speaker in a democracy you must show that you are "one of the boys." You might not be like them in education, speaking style, or economic circumstances; you must not be like them in that you have special knowledge relevant to the matter at hand; but you must be like them in that you share their moral values and political interests. I then give two further applications of this duality of ēthos: First, I use this duality to explore how the speaker claims our attention at all. Second, I use the duality of character to explain the role of principled arguments and the role of factual assertions in political speech.
But before I get to character, perhaps I should say something about my general view of rhetoric. 1 First, the notion of rhetoric as the art of moving the passions, which has a long history, but has been advocated in recent times as the core of rhetoric by Brian Vickers' book In Defense of Rhetoric. 2 Second, rhetoric as the art of changing the appearances of things: this is the notion of rhetoric at work in, say, Neil Postman, Murray Edelman, and Rod Hart when he is channeling Murray Edelman. 3 Third, rhetoric as adornment to the substance of what you have to say, the view of rhetoric put forward by Socrates in Plato's Gorgias. This third notion is, perhaps, a version or metaphor for rhetoric as the art of changing the appearances of things.
I reject all three of these views. In the account of rhetoric I present in Five Chapters, the speaker or writer or Youtube video artist moves the passions by showing the things that move the passions.
Second, there aren't things called appearances, and there is thus "no thing" you can add to a speech to change how it appears. Second, rhetoric is thinking about how to present things. In practice this usually means how to make things clear, how to speak the plain, clear, style, rather than the adorned style that comes naturally to us.
Thinking about how to present things can also mean thinking about how and when to stand back and let things speak for themselves.
The remainder of the paper will be devoted to three "issues of character:" namely, the duality of character: the shared and the unshared; ēthos and attention; ēthos, assertion, and argument.
THE DUALITY OF CHARACTER
By character, I mean the full-blown Aristotelian conception of ēthos as displayed in the "Art of More common, though, than opportunities to show superior judgment in circumstances of common knowledge are opportunities to show special knowledge of things present. Such opportunities may be classified in two categories, special technical knowledge, the more readily graspable form of expertise, and special knowledge from special experience. The expert with special technical knowledge sees things in a situation the ordinary person doesn't see, and then, with a bit of rhetorical skill, she can point these things out to her audience.
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Special knowledge from special experience, on the other hand, comes from what Max Black called "being in a position to know." 7 It is, for example, the kind of experience diplomats and intelligence operatives acquire in dealing with foreigners. Because dealing with foreigners and foreign policy is one thing that our leaders do that we, mostly, do not do, special knowledge from special experience is particularly salient in public life. 8 What the speaker offers to the audience is what they would know if they were in his or her position. Here not just the inference, but the process of inferring, can be shared between speaker and audience.
Another form of special knowledge from special experience that had, at least, a great deal of historical importance is special knowledge that comes from the experience of talking with God, that is, King's prophesy is credible in part because it is so limited: he has been, he says, to the mountaintop, and he has seen the Promised Land. But, and in this King is no Moses, of Dr. King's own personal fate, of the assassin lurking in the city, God has given him no word at all.
Let us return from the peak of revelation back to the plains of ordinary political speech. We need to understand why, even if you have special knowledge, I should believe your factual claims, or believe that you are presenting me with factual claims that will help me decide on a course that accords with my interests and values, rather than misleading me with irrelevant truths. For persuasion one also needs shared values and interests: One needs to trust that the speaker is genuinely concerned for your own good: that is Aristotle's eunoia. One also needs to believe that the speaker has a correct and not a perverted sense of that good, that he or she shares one's own values: that is what Aristotle, once again, called aretē. There is a failure of aretē if someone asserts that global climate change is unimportant because the future of the environment is unimportant, since we can all be presumed to agree that the future of the environment is important. There is a failure of eunoia or benevolence if a farmer from Siberia attempts to persuade his audience that global climate change is beneficial. This is because we can see why it would be beneficial to him in ways that it would not be beneficial to us! To sum up this first section, on the duality of character: are successful politicians "Everymen" or "heroes," to use the terminology of Johnson-Cartee and Copeland? I would say that successful This way of looking at the duality of character helps us to understand three things about politicians. First, politicians profit from certain markers of elite status; second, it is particularly difficult to project a persuasive character when one is trying to explain foreign affairs to a domestic public; and third, politicians must make a special effort to show that they can condescend to the little problems of little people.
First, politicians profit from certain marks of elite status: Elite status profits the speaker insofar as it marks him or her out as a possessor of special knowledge or special experience, but it is bad for the speaker insofar as it marks him with special values or interests.
Second, the problem of maintaining a persuasive character has its own peculiar challenges when one is trying to present a domestic political audience with the facts of global political life. Of course, in practice, it is very difficult to tell whether our agent is telling the truth when she tells us that we have to adjust our wishes to the views of others. Our agent knows the views of foreigners better than we do: that is why we have taken her on as our agent in dealing with them. Is she demanding that we adjust our wishes to others' views because we need to be reasonable about the views of others? Or, bad enough, because she finds others' values and interests more reasonable than ours? Or, even worse, because she has been corrupted by foreign influence to put others' interests and values ahead of ours?
Third, the duality of character helps us to understand the challenges that politicians face in condescending to the interests of their audience. Politicians have to show that they care about the problems of their audience, which can appear the little problems of little people. To see the ridiculousness of the situation one might compare the stentorian proclamation of the personified Athenian People in Aristophanes' comedy, Knights, a play which is perhaps the most powerful treatment of the relation between elite leaders and the populace who favor they seek. Responding to a gift of slippers from that would-be demagogue the Sausage-seller, the Athenian Demos proclaims with great dignity and no sense of irony "I judge you, of all whom I know, the man most benevolent to the city and these my little toesies" (Knights 873-4).
Politicians need to show that they care that our toesies not get cold, or that we get our prescription hemorrhoid medicine without too large a co-payment. To do this they make a show of listening, and in particular, they "show up" to listen to our grievances. Would-be democratic leaders thus show that they take our problems seriously -part of the difficulty of their task is that we, when get a proper perspective on our own unimportance, have a hard time believing that someone so handsome, well-dressed, and well-educated could take our problems seriously.
ĒTHOS AND ATTENTION
Contemplating the duality of character helps to understand the reasons why we attend to a speaker or writer. We can classify the reasons for attending to a speaker under two headings.
First heading: we may attend to the speaker because we have a preexisting relation to the speaker, and attending to what they say is one way of carrying on that relation. Mary comes to Topeka to give a lecture on the future of the International Whaling Commission:
her brother George attends and listens attentively, but not out of interest in whaling, international law, or the future of seemingly moribund international organizations, but simply as a way of "catching up" with Mary
Second heading: We attend to the speaker because we hope to hear something that we couldn't, for some reason, say ourselves. Here there are two subcategories that require analysis: cases where we listen primarily in order to be strengthened in our preexisting commitments, and cases where we listen primarily in order to receive novel and relevant information on which we propose to act.
Cases in the first subcategory include those whose in which we attend to the speaker in order to be reminded of some forgotten or neglected commitment, which is to say to be told something we don't know or something we have forgotten about the proper balance of our commitments. Here the pure case what God offers to Joshua: ‫ואמץ‬ ‫חזק‬ "Be strong and of courage" (Joshua 1:6). The preacher, at his or her best, strengthens some commitments, that is to say, the preacher strengthens those commitments at the expense of other commitments. After all, if I were previously aware of the commitments to which the preacher is drawing my attention, there must be a reason why I didn't act on them. Such a reason might not be sufficient, I may now think having heard the preacher, to excuse my behavior.
Note that the preacher enables me to see things I have always known, but to see them anew. In his sermon Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God (1741), Jonathan Edwards depicts unjustified human existence as spiders dangling over boiling pitch, suspended only by the Hand of God:
The God that holds you over the pit of hell, much as one holds a spider, or some loathsome insect over the fire, abhors you, and is dreadfully provoked: his wrath towards you burns like fire; he looks upon you as worthy of nothing else, but to be cast into the fire; he is of purer eyes than to bear to have you in his sight; you are ten thousand times more abominable in his eyes, than the most hateful venomous serpent is in ours.
And Edwards continues:
You hang by a slender thread, with the flames of divine wrath flashing about it, and ready every moment to singe it, and burn it asunder; and you have no interest in any Mediator, and nothing to lay hold of to save yourself, nothing to keep off the flames of wrath, nothing of your own, nothing that you ever have done, nothing that you can do, to induce
God to spare you one moment.
Yet for all the excitement, for all the vivid images, Edwards is conveying no new facts about the divine economy of salvation to a congregation brought up from childhood in a Calvinist church.
The point as it relates to ēthos is that I trust the preacher not because she knows something I don't, but because of her commitment to living a godly life, because she is different from me in the extent to which she takes seriously the things that I, too, think I ought to take into account more It is well known that the more arguments in a speech, the less the speaker is presuming on ēthos:
this is the basis for the claim that the appeal to authority is indeed a fallacy, an unworthy substitute for valid argument from shared premises. The converse statement appears paradoxical, but is nonetheless true: the more assertions in a speech, the more the speaker is presuming on his or her character. While The more facts in a speech, the more the speaker is demonstrating his purported special knowledge or expertise, precisely because he is "putting his reputation on the line." We infer from the detailed style of somebody's claim that they know the details because otherwise, we naturally assume, somebody who did know the details would call them on it. To parody Eugene Garver, one could say that "facts make a speech ethical": the very quantity of facts and the detail of factual depiction make us infer that the speaker really knows what he or she is talking about. In Against Ctesiphon, Aeschines accuses
Demosthenes of lying in concrete detail: "And on this account, too, he is greatly worthy of being hated, that he is such a wicked man as to destroy the signs of honesty." 16 
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The validity of our "ethical inference" or inference of ēthos, from the detailed style of somebody's claims to their actual knowledge, depends in practice on somebody out there who can criticize: who is listening critically, has the knowledge to critique and, the greatest challenge, has the ability to gain our attention with their critique. Because the critic usually can't get our attention, we are often fooled -fooled, say, into believing that Joe Biden's fluency with the terms of foreign policy discourse equals actual knowledge and judgment concerning foreign policy.
14 Arguments that infer conclusions from supposedly shared premises and aim to change minds about those conclusions assume that the audience is not intelligent or strong-willed enough to do the inferring on their own. Assertions assume that your audience lacks the relevant factual knowledge.
Speakers who are not preachers should keep in mind the great English journalist C.P. Scott's advice:
"Never overestimate your audience's knowledge; never underestimate their intelligence." 17 In other words: never assume that they have enough information, and never assume they are incapable of drawing inferences from the information they have or the information you supply them. 
